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Abstract—An important issue in public goods game is whether
player’s behaviour changes over time, and if so, how significant
it is. In this game players can be classified into different groups
according to the level of their participation in the public good.
This problem can be considered as a concept drift problem by
asking the amount of change that happens to the clusters of
players over a sequence of game rounds. In this study we present
a method for measuring changes in clusters with the same items
over discrete time points using external clustering validation
indices and area under the curve. External clustering indices
were originally used to measure the difference between suggested
clusters in terms of clustering algorithms and ground truth labels
for items provided by experts. Instead of different cluster label
comparison, we use these indices to compare between clusters of
any two consecutive time points or between the first time point
and the remaining time points to measure the difference between
clusters through time points. In theory, any external clustering
indices can be used to measure changes for any traditional (non-
temporal) clustering algorithm, due to the fact that any time
point alone is not carrying any temporal information. For the
public goods game, our results indicate that the players are
changing over time but the change is smooth and relatively
constant between any two time points.
Keywords—clustering; external cluster validity; measuring
change over time; temporal data
I. INTRODUCTION
In experimental economics there is an interest in how
players of public goods game change their strategy during
multiple rounds of the game play and jump from one type
of player into another [1], such as changing from conditional
co-operator to free rider behaviour (game and player types are
described in detail in later sections). This change can be seen
as a drift from the original label assigned to the players. As
defined by Widmer et al. [2], concept drift is an unexpected
change from the targeted future estimation due to uncalculated
hidden contexts in the system. Tsymbal [3] identified two types
of concept drift: sudden and gradual. This work presents a
method to measure the quantity of the change occurring within
populations in any two different time points.
There are many methods in machine learning for classifi-
cation, with the existence of concept drift [4]–[6] and methods
to detect it [7], [8]. Moreover measuring changes in clusters
for different time points are well studied in data analysis,
especially for data streams [9]–[11]. However, these methods
aim to find overall patterns of change in clusters’ location, size,
merging, emerging and/or dissipating rather than presenting a
measure of how much change has occurred in each cluster (i.e.
in which ratio items change their membership from one cluster
into another).
External cluster validity is primarily used to check the
performance of clustering algorithms by measuring the dif-
ference between ground truth labels given to the items by
experts and the group in which they have been placed by
a clustering algorithm [12]. This study uses external cluster
validity measures like variation of information [13]and area
under the curve of receiver operating characteristic [14] as
scaler measures, to show the amount of items that jumped from
one cluster to another between two consequent time points. To
accomplish this measurement, the items should be clustered
separately in every time point. As the clustering is performed
at a single time point, which eliminates the time dimension
for the collected data about items, theoretically any traditional
(non-temporal) clustering algorithm should be sufficient. After
clustering, an external clustering validity measure can quantify
the amount of changes between clusters at any two time points.
With the public goods game data, each game round is used as
a time point so that players are clustered in each time point
using k-means algorithm, then clusters of each time point are
compared with the first round to measure the amount of change
in the players’ strategies using multiple external clustering
validity measures and area under the curve. The results show
that players’ strategies (their original clusters in the first round)
change from one time point into another at a slow rate. To
compare our results, public goods games data were also tested
using MONIC, which is a method of detecting changes among
clusters in the data stream. The results show that there is a
periodic change in clusters as they disappear and other clusters
are emerging, but this is inconclusive as there is no indication
of whether the change originated from players’ strategies or
from the nature of algorithm, as it reduces the effect of the old
items in the cluster and removes them after two time points.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
This work uses data of public goods game as a case
study and multiple data mining principles like external cluster
validity, area under the curve and data analysis methods
of detecting changes of clusters in the data streams. These
subjects are reviewed in the next few sections, providing the
relationship between the subject and our study.
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A. Public Goods Game
Public good is any type of services or resources that cannot
be withheld from individuals without competition to benefit
from these resources and services due to their characteristics
of being non-rivalry and non-excludable [15]. Examples for
public goods are: city parks as all citizens can attend the park
while a fraction of them are paying to maintain them, and
Street Lights which is useful for everybody while only tax
payers are contributing in keeping them alive. Public goods
game is an experimental game that simulates real situations of
public good in a lab with restricted conditions and focused
purposes to conduct experiments. There are many slightly
different variations of this game, however the data which has
been used in this paper as a case study is based on the model
of Fischbacher et al [16].
The public goods game experiment of Fischbacher et al
[16] consists of four players, each of whom has a choice
to contribute in a project representing the public good. After
all players made their choices of contribution the game will
finish and their final outcome will be revealed to them. Players
are then redistributed to play with other new partners for
another round of the game. However, players might adjust their
strategy of contribution and learn general players’ behaviour in
previous games. For every round each player has 20 tokens to
play with representing money, which they can contribute with,
and after the end of the experiment they will be exchanged
with a rate into real money to ensure that players are playing
thoughtfully.
Gaining the maximum amount of tokens is the main goal
of each player, and it is the basis for determining whether
players change their behaviour in the next round or not. As
each player has 20 tokens, they can contribute all, none or any
amount to projects representing public good, so that the total
amount of contribution of all players and its extra benefit will
be distributed between them evenly. The amount of gain for a
player i (gaini) is demonstrated by the equation gaini = 20 
gi + 0:4
P4
j=1 gj , where gi is the player’s own contribution
and gj represents all players’ contributions. To illustrate this
equation: (1) if no player contributes in the project then each
will end up with 20 tokens as they started; (2) if all players
contribute with 10 tokens then each player will end up with
20-10+0.4 (10+10+10+10) = 26 tokens; and (3) if only one
player contributes with all 20 tokens while the others do not
contribute, then she will end up with 8 tokens while all others
will gain 28 tokens.
However, regardless of players’ potential adjustment of
their contribution behaviour during multiple rounds (10 rounds
or more), economists [17] classify them based on a contribu-
tion table of static data filled once by the players prior to
the game rounds. This table consists of players’ answers for
a hypothetical rounded average contribution of others. That
is, for each possible contribution from 0 to 20 tokens, as an
average, from her partners she should decide how much she
is willing to contribute. Naturally, this initial willingness for
contribution might change due to the factor of learning about
other players’ contribution behaviour, which causes concept
drift throughout game time points (rounds). The classes as
defined by economists are:
 Conditional Co-operator: players who show more will-
ingness to contribute when other players contribute
more.
 Free Riders: players who do not contribute to the
project regardless of other players’ contribution status.
 Triangle Contributors: players whose contribution rise
to a point then starts to decline afterward regarding
other players’ contribution.
 Others: players with no clear pattern in their contri-
bution style.
B. External Cluster Validity
External criteria validate results based on some predefined
structure for data that is provided beside clustered data in form
of labelling. The main task of this approach is to determine a
statistical measure for the similarity or dissimilarity between
obtained clusters and labels [12], [18].
1) Variation of Information: This index measure is based
on contingency table which is a matrix with r  k, where r
is number of produced clusters and k is number of externally
provided clusters. Each element of this matrix contains number
of agreed instances between any two clusters of the externally
provided and produced clusters. As introduced by Meil [19],
this index calculates mutual information and entropy between
previously provided and produced clusters derived from con-
tingency table V I(C; T ) = 2H(T;C) H(T ) H(C), where
C is produced clusters and T is ground truth clusters, H(C)
is entropy of C and H(T ) is entropy of T .
2) Pair-Wise Measures: There are multiple external clus-
tering validity measures (e.g. Jaccard Coefficient, Fowlkes-
Mallows Measure and Rand Statistic) which use the partition
and cluster label information over all pairs of points [19]. If
any two pairs of points are in the same cluster and have the
same label then they will be counted as true positive (TP). If
they are in the same cluster but have different labels, they are
false positive (FP). If a pair of points is in different clusters
and each point has different labels, this is true negative (TN);
otherwise, the pair is false negative (FN) [20]. Each of these
measures uses the following equations:
 Jaccard Coefficient is function of TP pairs over all
pairs except for TN So that JC =
TP
TP + FN + FP
.
 Rand Statistic is fraction of agreed pairs (that is TP
and TN) over all pairs. So that RS =
TP + TN
N
where N is number all pairs.
 Fowlkes-Mallows Measure is a function of overall
precision and recall values, which makes FM =p
recall  pricition where recall = TP
TP + FP
and pricition =
TP
TP + FN
so that MF =
TPp
(TP + FN)(TP + FP )
.
3) Area Under the Curve: Area Under the Curve (AUC)
of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) is a scalar measure
originally used by Bradley [14] to calculate the performance of
machine learning algorithms, such as classification. The ROC
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curve is a graph of true positive rate (TPR) and false positive
rate (FPR) of the predicted classifier’s result compared to the
real class for each item, so that AUC is the area under the
ROC curve whose value can be between 0 and 1. Methods of
calculating AUC vary according to the nature of application
and available data. In this study we implemented R language
[21] using the trapezoidal method of Fawcett [22]. The multi-
class AUCs are calculated using the equation of Hand and Till
[23] auc =
c
c(c  1)
P
aucs, where c is number of clusters
and aucs is a set of AUC between any two classes.
4) Measuring Cluster Changes in Data Streams: Many
techniques and methods are introduced to track cluster changes
in data streams, each of which focuses on different aspects
of change that happen in clusters, like location, dimension
and existence. Furthermore, different ways of dealing with
data and clustering have been presented, such as MONIC
model [24], which targets detecting cluster transition over
accumulated data. This method provides an ageing function
for clustering data, which prioritizes new records over old
ones, and eliminates records older than two time points. This
model relies on accumulated data over time to detect cluster
matches; therefore, it cannot be used with non-accumulated
data. Moreover it emphases on measuring cluster changes and
it cannot detect changes in cluster membership for individual
items which have been clustered over time points.
Another method introduced by Gnnemann et al [25] traces
cluster evolution as change in behaviour of items’ recorded
values in high dimensional data sets. Instead of object identifier
between consequent snapshots of data, different types of map-
ping functions are used to map clusters according to their val-
ues in different dimensions and subspaces. This method counts
number of various changes that occur to clusters of any high
dimensional data set and it has an advantage of functioning
even for items without having to track between snapshots, but
it lacks any mean of quantifying the changes themselves. In
other words, there is no indication for the quantity of change
that happens to any cluster in two consecutive time points.
Hawwash and Nasraoui [26] introduced a framework of
data stream mining using statistical cluster measures like
cardinality, scale and density of clusters to detect milestones
of clusters change and monitoring the behaviour of clusters. It
targets accumulative clustering on data streams, but instead of
using fixed time window for clustering, it uses milestones to
detect next best clustering time.
Another method presented by Kalnis et al [27] for cluster-
ing moving objects in the snapshots of spatio-temporal data
is cluster mapping function, by which clusters are treated as
sets and the cardinality ratio of intersection is calculated at
each two time constitutive clusters over their union. If the
ratio passes a certain threshold, the cluster is considered to be a
moving cluster. This method detects ”move” in overall clusters
with visual aids, which assists human experts in grasping
changes in the underlying data, which is good for tracking
one type of cluster change for moving clusters. However, it
does not provide mean to quantify the magnitude of change
for overall clustering objects.
The previous methods detect changes in temporal data
by monitoring cluster changes as a whole in terms of split,
absorbed, disappear, emerged etc., which is a good indication
for detecting change, but it does not specify its magnitude.
III. METHODOLOGY
To measure changes in the items’ behaviour or drift from
their original status there should be at least more than one
reading for the same attributes under consideration at differ-
ent time points. The data should be separated into multiple
segments based on the number of consequent readings of
items’ attributes so that each segment of data contains a single
value of these readings. The items of each time point should
be clustered using same clustering algorithm and identical
parameters (like number of clusters).
After clustering, each item in every time point will be a
member of a single cluster. For consequent time points items
might belong to the same clusters or they might drift from one
cluster into another. We might be able to quantify the amount
of drifts (change of label) between any two time points by
using external cluster validity indices.
As explained previously, functions of external cluster va-
lidity measures use two inputs for their calculations. The first
is ground truth labels provided by experts T and second cluster
groups C which are produced using one of the clustering
methods, e.g. k-means. In this work we use these validity
measures with different inputs. Clusters of the first time point is
used instead of items’ ground truth labels T to find the amount
of difference between items’ initial labels and their possible
consequent drift from that label. Another possible method is to
use consequent time points to measure changes between every
pair. That is, for each time point t = 1, 2, ..., N-1 we can
use any pairs of t, t+1 as inputs to the validity measure and
quantify their differences.
IV. TESTS AND RESULTS
We used two types of data to measure changes over time.
First, synthesis data is used to check the validity of the method
and to show the efficiency of different proposed metrics to
evaluate the amount of change that is happen to the data set
between two time points. Second type is two different datasets
for public goods game which they are used to measure the drift
of players’ behaviour from their initial round and other later
rounds.
A. Tests with Synthesised Data
For this test a set of 500 items are generated1 on a Cartesian
plane with 4 distinct clusters. The centre of these clusters is
(0, 0) on the x, y plane. To simulate next time point a specific
number of the items are jumped from one cluster to another
by changing items’ x and/or y coordinates sign. The number
of items that jumped from one cluster to another is determined
by a suede random function, with values between 0 and 20.
Moreover a small amount of randomized change from there
positions are introduced to the items to simulate the change
which happened to the items within same cluster. By repeating
these jumps and jiggles 19 extra time points are generated from
the original dataset which all results in 20 time points. The
1Data-generator and change-measure codes are available at
https://goo.gl/8DBuII
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Fig. 1. First, middle and last time points for the synthesis data, which contains 500 items divided into four distinct clusters. The data set is repeated for 20
different time points, showing how a random number of items drifted from one cluster to another.
(a) First round (b) Forth round (c) Last round
Fig. 2. Player’s own contribution compared to co-players’ contribution in first, fourth and last rounds of the game.
first, middle and last time points of the dataset are shown in
Fig. 1
Datasets of all time points are clustered separately using
k-means clustering with four clusters, and then the proposed
metrics for measuring the quantity of the drift are applied on
the clusters of the data by comparing the original first time
point with all other time points to measure the changes which
are happen in between time points.
All methods of cluster validity measures and AUC are
positively recognised and quantified changes between the first
time point and all other consequent time points as can be
seen in Fig. 3. However the IV measure could not fit with
other measures, as it returns zero for identical clusters, and
its value increases as differences between clusters are bigger,
while all other measures return one for a perfect match between
clusters of two different time points, and decrease their value
as difference between clusters increases. Thus VI values are
scaled down and reversed using the equation newV IResult =
1   V Iresult
max(V Iresult)
to have the same behaviour as other
measures.
One thing to notice is that the metrics Jaccard, FM and
reversed VI are exaggerating the results of the consequent
changes of items’ jumps, this might be due to the underlying
equations as they are designed to aggressively detect miss-
clustered items compared with the labels, but this might give
a false perception for a grate or sudden change if used to
measure differences between two time points.
B. Tests with Public Goods Games Data
Two different sets with identical attributes but different
players and different time point lengths are used to measure
how much players drift from their first time point readings [16].
Both data sets have attributes to identify players, determine
time points, show players’ own contribution, their belief about
other players’ contribution and other players’ actual contri-
bution in each time point. The first data set consists of 140
players, each of whom played 10 rounds, and for the second
data set 128 players, each of whom played 27 rounds.
In both datasets while approaching the end of the game,
in later rounds, players tend to contribute less and their
expectation about other players’ contribution correspondingly
decreases. This is shown in Fig. 2 for the 10 rounds game data
set. This drop in contribution might not be an indication of
concept drift, as the players in the same class might all start
to follow same pattern, hence they will remain in the same
class together, which makes overall class contribution drop.
The original players’ classes provided by economists [28]
are not used as their classification despite being useful to in-
dicate the number of classes, but as mentioned before they are
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Fig. 3. Results of amount of shifted items between first and other time points
using external cluster validity and AUC of ROC functions consequent time
points.
not based on the temporal attributes used in this experiment,
so we did not depend on these labels.
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Fig. 4. Players’ drift ratio of public goods games; 10 rounds’ data comparing
first and other consequent time points using Rand VI and AUC measures.
To find the drift ratio of players between first and next
consequent game rounds we used kmeans to cluster players
in each time point. Economic classifications suggest that there
are four classes of players, so four clusters were used as a
parameter for kmeans to cluster players in each time point,
after which all measures are used to quantify players’ drift
from originally allocated clusters in the first round. For both
data sets the results in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show negative (-0.02,
-0.003 for 10 and 27 rounds) slopes of linear regression of
AUC indicating that the players tend to slowly change their
behaviour toward the end of the game rounds.
The values of AUC and Rand index of quantifying changes
are comparable while other measures Jaccard, VI and FM are
showing different results for the two data sets. In 10 rounds
data set the later metrics are consistent with AUC and Rand
as they detect more changes in the later rounds however they
also show that there are more quantity of change between first
and other time points. In the 27 rounds game dataset results
of the later metrics (Jaccard, VI and FM) are not conclusive
and they are too volatile as well as they might suggest that
there is less change between first time point clusters and later
consequent time points.
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Fig. 5. Players’ drift ratio of public goods games; 27 rounds’ data comparing
first and other consequent time points using Rand VI and AUC measures.
V. MEASURING PLAYERS’ STRATEGY CHANGES USING
MONIC
We used MONIC2 to gain more insight about the public
goods games data and to compare our results with the existing
methods of measuring cluster changes in different time points.
The data for each time period were clustered separately using
k-means with four clusters. The clustering was carried out
on the main temporal attributes of the data, namely belief
and contribution, then the data and cluster labels of items in
each consequent pair of time points was fed to the MONIC
algorithm to calculate changes to clusters from one time point
to another. The algorithm calculated the number of survived,
appeared and disappeared clusters, as shown in figures 6 and
7, for the ten rounds of the game.
In the first data set (10 rounds), the number of survived
clusters reduced from four clusters between the first and second
time points until it reached zero, while new clusters appeared in
the middle of the fifth and sixth game rounds, then the number
rose again until the end of the game. This might be due to the
fact that players are changing their strategies and exploring
new options until they ultimately settle on a certain strategic
pattern. This change is consistent with our findings, as the
measures slightly increase between the fifth and seventh time
points, which might be an indication of players changing their
strategy back to their original ones. As Keser and Winden [29]
suggest, this change might be due to the players responding to
the average contribution of other players in the previous round.
The results for the 27 rounds game is not straightforward,
as the numbers of cluster survivals, appearances and disappear-
ances change more frequently. However, the cyclic pattern of
2Available at http://infolab.cs.unipi.gr/people/ntoutsi/monic.html
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Fig. 6. Number of survival, appearance and disappearance of clusters
between every tow consequent time points for ten rounds public goods game
as measured by MONIC.
increasing and decreasing number of survived clusters might
be an effect of changing players’ strategies or due to the
underlying algorithm, as it provides an ageing factor to the
items.
As the MONIC algorithm was originally introduced to
detect cluster changes in data stream, it uses an ageing factor
which reduces the effect of older items in the cluster and
removes items older than two time points [24]. This ageing
factor is essential for the algorithm to keep up-to-date with
the flowing data stream and give the right results for the
current status of the clusters. However, this might not be useful
for public goods games data, as there is a fixed number of
players which might result in the removal of players who stay
in the same cluster for long time points. The effect of the
ageing might not be obvious in the 10 rounds game due to the
limited number of time points, but it might undermine players’
strategies.
While the proposed method assumes a fixed number of
clusters to calculate items membership change, the MONIC
algorithm is a good method to have insights on the available
clusters and their stability by measuring the number of survived
clusters between two time points. However it does not measure
the amount of items drifting from one cluster into another,
which can be detected by the proposed method, as it introduces
a specific ratio between each consequent time point, indicating
the amount of change happening to the items in the clusters
by calculating their membership change among clusters.
By comparing results from the proposed method and
MONIC we can conclude that the players slightly and gradu-
ally change their cluster membership. The proposed method
gives an exact number for the change while the MONIC
presents overall clusters movement and change.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a method to quantify changes over time
for items across multiple readings at different times for the
same attributes using external cluster validity measures and
area under the curve of receiver operating characteristic. In
the proposed method, each item in each time point is clustered
separately with the same parameters and clustering algorithm.
After clustering the amount of difference between items,
cluster labels of first cluster and other consequent clusters are
measured instead of ground truth labels and provided clusters.
This method proved to work on both synthetic and real
public goods game data. For synthetic data measures like Rand,
VI and AUC worked very well by reflecting the amount of
jumps into a quantifiable scaler. Other measures like Jaccard
and FM were very good at detecting changes, but they tended
to exaggerate the amount of change happening in clusters’
items. For the public goods game data sets, in both 10 and
27 rounds, gradually from one time point to another small
numbers of players drifted from their original clusters.
Despite its useful simplicity, the proposed method has a
drawback in its reliance on the first time point clusters as
a reference or baseline for all other consequent time points,
as the first clusters might not always be good representatives
for the entire data set or latent behaviour at baseline. This
might be solved by using a temporal classification method that
can represent overall items’ movements across all time points.
However using traditional classifications algorithms might tend
to exaggerate changes over multiple time points, especially
when attribute values of most classes’ populations change
simultaneously.
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